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INTRODUCTION

Political scientists and political economists who study processes of
constitution making and systems of constitutional law are usually seen
as doing something rather different than the work of those of us who
ponder prescriptive constitutional theory. We share, of course, an
interest in constitutionalism, politics, and law. Moreover, we have come
to think in modem academic discourse that social science conceptions of
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. J.D.
1987, Harvard Law School; B.A. 1984, California State University. This Essay was
originally prepared for a conference on state constitutional law at the University of New
Mexico School of Law. The ideas contained herein benefited from the participants at
that conference and also from my colleagues at both Boalt Hall School of Law and the
University of San Diego School of Law.

constitutionalism are incomplete without a substantial understanding of
the role of law and, more particularly, without an appreciation for the
fact that much of American constitutionalism is infused with normative
theory. We believe as constitutional lawyers that our legal scholarship is
impoverished without a rich understanding of the political and economic
foundations of constitutions and the processes of constitution making.
Nevertheless, as legal scholars interested in constitutional questions, we
think we are doing something different than the work of political
scientists and political economists.
This disjunction is especially troubling for those of us who are
simultaneously interested in issues of positive constitutionalism and
normative constitutional theory. Positive constitutionalism means not
only describing but also theorizing about elemental questions of
constitutional structure and theory. Key positive questions include: Why
do certain constitutional forms emerge and survive? What is the role of
political choice, by legislators and by citizen voters, in constructing
constitutions and constitutional discourse? What is the relationship
between constitutionalism and constitutional law? By normative
constitutional theory, I mean the critical evaluation of constitutions. The
key normative question is: What ought a particular constitution say?
Those of us interested in both positive constitutionalism and normative
constitutional theory would like to think that we are bringing together
the inquiries of both of these areas-not only to reiterate the trivially
true point that there are inevitably normative elements in positive
constitutionalism and vice versa, but also to further the agenda of
improving constitutions and constitutional law. Therefore, we resist the
traditional division of functions between those who are preoccupied with
positive constitutionalism and those who toil primarily on normative
questions.
To the ear of someone whose enterprise is principally understanding
and interpreting the United States Constitution, this endeavor to draw
together positive constitutionalism and normative theory sounds perhaps
abstract at best, and anachronistic at worst. After all, what utility is there
in obsessing over the role of political choice by legislators and citizen
voters in constructing constitutional discourse, except as part of the
historical exegesis into the views of the framers?' Moreover, the battle
1. Such exegesis forms an important part of recent scholarly discourse on
constitutional theory pertaining to the Federal Constitution. Indeed, the 1990s are
proving an especially fertile time for neo-historical examinations of positive
constitutionalism. See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL

LIBERALISM (1996) (describing neo-originalist writings); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICs AND IDEAS INTHE MAKING OF THE CONSTrrUTION (1996). At the
same time, mainstream constitutional theory continues to march ahead as principally a
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for interpretive supremacy has been long waged and decisively won by
the courts. Judges, especially the Supreme Court, are the principal
audience for prescriptive analysis; structural questions concerning
constitutional architecture and the resilience of constitutional strategies
and the like are pertinent only insofar as they shed light on the sorts of
normative arguments which "count" with judges. This does not mean
that, from the perspective of constitutional scholars of the U.S.
Constitution, there is nothing to the careful study of positive

constitutionalism, but it does tend to diminish the imperative of drawing
together positive constitutionalism and normative theory.
A different challenge faces those of us preoccupied with state
constitutional law and the relationship among levels and layers of
government within a state constitutional system. We are interested in
how our states confront challenges concerning regulation, politics,
institutional design, and social and economic goods and services.2
Moreover, we are interested in how state constitutionalism as a more or
less coherent theoretical apparatus addresses ubiquitous questions of
institutional design and competence. The descriptive questions concern
what we see, and what we think about what we see, when we look into
state constitutional forms; the normative question concerns how to make
the system work better. However quaint these questions sound to folks
steeped in federal constitutional discourse, they are real and enduring
when examined through the lens of state constitutionalism.3
The questions are real and enduring because of qualities characteristic
of state constitutions and their particular and general histories. These
qualities are distinct from our federal Constitution in ways that make
pertinent our attention to the intersections of positive constitutionalism
and prescriptive theory. Further, these distinctions help shape the
domain of normative theory within which our efforts are carried out.

normative enterprise. See, e.g., Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65
FORDHAm L. REv. 1247, 1247-1818 (1997).

2. We may be interested in this from the perspective of one particular state or
from a comparative perspective, with the 50 states as our laboratories. See, e.g., G.
ALAN TARR, UNDERSTA DING STATE CONsTrrurnoNs 6-28 (1998).

3. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its

Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271 (1998) (tracing the framework within which one
creatively thinks about state constitutional theory).

I.

THE DIsTINcT NATURE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS

American state constitutions are documents shaped over the course of
two centuries. All but the original thirteen states came into the union
with their constitutions, after the establishment of the national
constitution. Many of these post-1787 state constitutions track in
important respects national constitutional discourse-including the
establishment in each document of a separation of powers and, in all but
one, a bicameral state legislature. They also each contain a bill of rights,

containing collections of rights that are, for the most part, at least as
protective of individual liberty as those embodied in the national
constitution.4 But it is here that the similarities end.
The first of four critical distinctions between federal and state
constitutions is that state constitutions are documents of limit rather than
grant.5 The essential notion of the state police power expresses the core
idea of the state legislative and executive power under principles of state
constitutionalism, which is that state political entities may exercise all
powers necessary to carry out state goals, except as limited by the
national constitution. These goals are, of course, to be defined by state
political institutions. From the perspective of constitutional theory more
generally, this principle is both peculiar and fundamental. It is peculiar
to lawyers steeped in the American national constitutional tradition,
wherein the basic idea that the federal government has limited powers is
primary.6 The states' police power and the corollary that state
constitutions are documents of limit, not grant, are the direct inverse of
this. It is fundamental, for it tends to construct the system of state
decision-making around the ideology of political discretion and choice,
rather than around an ideology of the rule of law. This is especially
important with respect to the relationship between state political
institutions and local governments. Whereas states occupy an essential
role in the American constitutional system, the notion that there is
an equivalent principle of federalism-or "localism"--in state
constitutionalism is highly contested. 7 It is commonplace to observe that
4.

See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS,

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

CASES AND

MATEmALS 171-87 (3d ed. 1999); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protectionof IndividualRights, 90 HARv. L. REv.489, 491 (1977).
5. See Eugene McQuiHin, Constitutional Right of Local Self-Government of
Municipalities,and PrinciplesApplicable to Central Control, 35 AM. L. REv. 510, 522

(1901). A document of limit imposes constraints upon a presumption of unlimited
power. By contrast, a document of grant creates certain enumerated powers for an
otherwise powerless entity.
6. See, e.g., M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 405 (1819) ("This

[federal] government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.").
7. The term "localism" has confused things somewhat by borrowing an analogy
from discourse about federalism. See generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
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local governments are creatures of the state.' Therefore, the plethora of
legal questions raised by state and local conflicts in the fifty states
occupies a fundamentally different conceptual ground than the enduring
questions of federalism that are part of the structure of constitutionalism
at the national level.
The second key distinction between the federal and state constitutions
concerns the frequency of amendments over time. Although more
practical than theoretical, the observation of such a difference has a
considerable impact on the nature of the positive enterprise, whether
considered by social scientists or by legal scholars. The national
constitution, as is well known, is remarkably impervious to change,
especially when measured against the constitutions of other nations and
those of the fifty American states. A mere sixteen amendments separate
us now, in the year 2000, from our predecessors in 1789 when the
constitution, with the first ten amendments, was adopted as fundamental
law.9 Calls for a national constitutional convention have gone unheeded;
attempts to amend the Constitution have mostly been defeated.0
Interestingly, the efforts to defeat various amendment initiatives have
employed a rhetoric that stresses not only the undesirability of particular
proposals, but also the caution we should exercise prior to marring this
enduring document."
I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1990). Federalism
expresses not merely, or especially, a principle about national-state relations, but rather a

core constitutional principle of power allocation. See DAVI L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM:
A DiALOGuE 58-75 (1995). Perhaps critics of federalism are correct in regarding the
concept of federalism as anachronistic in the modem administrative state. See, e.g.,
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. Rtv. 903, 903-09 (1994). Or perhaps they are wrong. See, e.g., SHAPMo,

supra, at 58-106; Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism,47 VAND. L. REV. 1485,

1560-61 (1994). But tying federalism as a constitutional principle to questions of
national/state economic, political, and social relations requires a substantive argument.
Likewise, insisting that there is something called our "localism" that describes the
relationship between local governments and the states requires not only a political and
economic argument for local prerogatives and power, but also a coherent political theory
that explains why localism is properly a part of state constitutionalism.
8. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
9. The first ten Amendments, commonly called the Bill of Rights, were ratified in
1791. Although technically there have been 27 Amendments, the Eighteenth
Amendment was later repealed. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI.
10. See Alexander Hanebeck, Democracy Within Federalism: An Attempt to
Reestablish Middle Ground, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 395-98 (2000) (examining
failed proposed amendments).
11. See id.

This rhetoric would seem rather strange in the context of state
constitutional discourse. State constitutions are, on average, much
longer then the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, state constitutional
amendments are frequent, if not routine. This Essay does not propound
a theory of why we amend state constitutions so readily when we cannot
bring ourselves to do likewise in the federal area; the national
constitution is impervious to change mostly because it is slightly more
difficult to amend than are state constitutions. The basic point is the
descriptive one: state constitutional forms are considerably more
contingent and transient than national constitutional forms. State
constitutions, while not up for grabs, permit and promote fluid,
politically salient, and reformist impulses.
There are a number of ways in which this fluidity shapes intellectual
discourse. To begin with, the amenability to change means that, so far
as the state constitution is concerned, there is more that is fundamental
to fight about. In one of California's most recent passes at reform, there
were proposals calling for a unicameral legislature, for radical surgery
on the executive branch, and for altering the balance of power between
state and local governments. There are a myriad of less far-reaching
reforms as well. Much of the debate involves contests over the basic
terms of state constitutional discourse and constitutional structure. It is
impossible to have such conversation without articulating the competing
visions of constitutionalism. To have effective reform discussions, then,
we must tie together positive constitutionalism and normative theory.
We are, after all, haggling over the fundamentals of state constitutional
architecture. Rarely have we seen such fundamental contests waged at
the national level. Perhaps the New Deal was the last time, as Bruce
Ackerman argues; 3 however, even then most of the structural terms of
the debate-for example, whether we would preserve a unitary
presidency, a bicameral legislature, some separation of powers, and
federalism-were essentially off the table.
Many of these fundamental debates being waged at the state
constitutional level-now, and frequently in the past-concern issues of
constitutional structure. This is highly unusual when compared with
traditional federal constitutional discourse. No one believes that the
presence and prevalence of rights in state constitutions is unimportant;
on the contrary, what we often describe as the revival of state
constitutional law and theory in recent years owes a great debt to the
efforts of the late Justice William Brennan and others who insisted that
12. See CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT
MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE (Bruce E, Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995).
13.

See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 99-104 (1991).
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the key to augmenting individual liberty in an era of judicial
conservativism was through vigorous articulation and enforcement of
state constitutional rights.14 However, most current political debates
over state constitutional reform involve not issues of individual rights,
but governmental structure and the balance of powers.
If we pause to think about the range of contemporary policy issues
that constantly come under scrutiny in the popular press and in academic
commentary-criminal justice, welfare reform, the state of our cities,
racial justice, and economic opportunity-we see that these issues
frequently are framed around calls for reforming state political, legal,
and economic institutions. It is not that federal intervention is being
ignored; it is rather that the reality of our current political situation is
that widespread federal intervention along the model of the War on
Poverty, and even more modest initiatives such as general revenue
sharing, is unfashionable. "Devolution" is the theme of the day; what
this devolution means in practice, rather than as a slogan, is the
reformulation of state and local strategies for policy change. 5 For
constitutional lawyers, the challenge is to think creatively about how
state constitutionalism can confront this challenge. What are the

obstacles? What are the opportunities? Given the nature of these
modem challenges, it ought not to surprise us that the key contests are
over structural constitutional issues. When discussions roam over the
range of contemporary constitutional forms, such as the bicameral state
legislature and the modem system of municipal management,
sophisticated analysts are likely to tie the discussion of the costs and
benefits of these forms to substantive policy debates. 6
An aspect of constitutional discourse that reveals the third difference
between federal and state constitutionalism is a shift in focus from courts
as the ultimate audience for normative constitutional theory to the
legislature and administrative agencies. When constitutional law is
14. See Brennan, supra note 4, at 491 ("State constitutions... are a font of
individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law.").
15.

See PAuLE. PETESON, THE-PRICEOFFEDERALISM 69-75 (1995).

16. While the contrast between the policy-laden debates in state constitutional
discourse and the more rarified debate in federal constitutional discourse is striking,
there are conspicuous counterexamples that illustrate the potential of policy-sensitive
constitutional argument at the national level. See, e.g, ALAN BRINKLEY ET AL., NEw
FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTrrurION (1997) (offering creative
ideas about how the Federal Constitution can, and ought to, respond to modem
challenges).

regarded as the business of the courts, normative debate is shaped
around the distinct enterprise of adjudication. The most conspicuous
efforts at deep constitutional theory from both the right and the left have,
naturally, concentrated on judicial decision-makers. State constitutional
decision-making is, as previously discussed, the product of political
choice by legislators and agencies, as well as by judicial decree. While
federal constitutional decision-making entails inter-institutional action in
theory, processes of state constitutional decision-making ought to reflect
such institutional eclecticism as a matter of common practice.
This shift from courts to legislatures affects the dynamics of
normative constitutional theory in interesting ways. The constitutional
rhetoric available to individuals and interest groups looking to influence
public policy in legislatures and agencies is different from the typical
rhetoric of legal argument in courts. Adjudication, as Lon Fuller
reminded us over a quarter century ago, has a distinct logic and a
particular series of intellectual moves and agendas.
We may make
legal arguments to legislatures, and we certainly develop law through
administrative decision-making. Yet different expectations, roles, and
practical judgments shape this process. Not only are the fundamentals of
the legislative and administrative agenda different than the more narrow

agenda of constitutional adjudication in courts, but the institutional
matrices within which legal and political judgments are made are
importantly distinct."9 Moreover, these differences can be expected to
shape reformists' expectations and hence their reform strategies. Where
constitutional politics become, to borrow from Professor Ackerman's
framework, part of the processes of "normal" politics, and where,
therefore, legislatures and agencies become among the prime state
constitutional architects, the mechanisms that are created in order to
influence these political processes take a certain form. For example,
if the centrality--or, at least, the exclusivity-of constitutional
adjudication as a method for framing constitutional discourse is replaced
by legislative, administrative, and citizen/grass-roots action, then the
pressure groups who regularly participate in state constitutional politics
will organize their strategies accordingly. This deliberate organization,
in turn, reinforces the system of constitutionalism. This "strategic"
explanation may help us understand why state constitutional decisionmaking continues to proceed on a very different track than federal
constitutional decision-making and, as will be argued in Part HI, why it
17.
L. REv.
18.
19.

530

See generallyLon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv.
353 (1978) (providing a detailed analysis and definition of adjudication).
See ROBERTM. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE 1-37 (1988).
ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 230.
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is necessary to understand better the domain of normative theory in state
constitutional law.
The fourth and final elemental difference relates directly to the shift in
focus from courts to legislatures and agencies as the key arenas in which
constitutional discourse is shaped.
Constitutional adjudication is
attached firmly in our minds to a conception of the constitution as grand
law; constitutional theory is grand theory. The rewards and incentives in
a variety of institutional contexts, from the organized bar to the legal
academy, reinforce the idea that shaping constitutional law through
theories of constitutional adjudication is the high calling of prescriptive
theory. This theory building has, perhaps paradoxically, proceeded with
little interpenetration by insights into the structure and practice of the
judiciary as a legal institution. Political scientists who do "public law"
are in a rather marginal position vis-A-vis the main exponents of
normative constitutional theory in the legal academy; the reverse is true
as well. Constitutional theory as developed in traditional legal discourse
is sharply criticized by political scientists as a naive and unrealistic
depiction of modem judicial practice. Constitutional theorists resist this
critique pretty well, however, by guarding the temple of normative
constitutional theory from inroads by positive constitutionalism and
institutional exegesis. What is at stake is not merely the disjunction
between the "is" and the "ought," but, more pertinently, whether we
ought to continue to instantiate constitutional adjudication as the highest,
purest form of legal craftsmanship.
This account of constitutional theorists is intended neither as a
caricature nor as part of an argument for or against their view. This
Essay only suggests that the ascription of "high lawcraft" to
constitutional adjudication that characterizes most of mainstream
constitutional theory today should be tied tightly to the agenda of
constitutional theorists who study thefederal Constitution. Whether it is
or ought to be tied quite as tightly to state constitutional theorists
remains an open question. Perhaps constitutional adjudication is
pedigreed because this is where most theorists believe that constitutional
decision-making takes place. This is, as it were, much like the story of
the man who looks for his keys where the light is best. Or perhaps the
pedigree is attached to adjudication because of a substantive theory that
explains why constitutional adjudication ought to be distinct from, say,
the political judgment that infuses decision-making in nonjudicial
institutions. Ronald Dworkin, for example, surely has an embedded

theory of judicial decision-making through adjudication within his
general theory of legal interpretation;' one could hardly substitute
Congressman X or Administrator Y for Hercules in Dworkin's account.2'
Nor could legislators and administrators fit the bill as judicial decisionmakers under most modem theories of constitutional interpretation,
which rest on assumptions about the comparative institutional
competencies of different legal institutions.
However, when we turn the light toward state constitutional decision-

making, we ought to clearly specify our assumptions and theories about
adjudication versus legislation versus administration in a state
constitutional system. Our expectations of state judges may come to be
altogether different from our expectations of federal judges. Many state
judges are chosen by a process that significantly differs from the federal
system. Given this fact, it would be surprising if the structure of
incentives were identical between these two levels of government.
Moreover, state legislatures and agencies, as political units and sources
of legal power, vary significantly among the fifty states, and these differ
collectively from their federal counterparts. In light of these differences,
we are entitled to ask: (1) Is the state constitution grand law, necessarily
to be developed through the discourse of constitutional adjudication, in
the same way the federal Constitution is developed? (2) Is state
constitutional adjudication a distinctly normative process for the
articulation and interpretation of public values and the deployment of
special legal judgment and wisdom, or is the legislature equally well
suited to receive normative constitutional argument?

II. FRAMING THE NORMATIVE QUESTIONS iN STATE
CONSTITUTIONALISM

Positive constitutionalism and normative constitutional theory ought
to be tied more closely together as a research enterprise with regard to
issues arising under state constitutions. The reasons, as spelled out in
the previous section, concern characteristics particular to state
constitutionalism as a subject of inquiry. Moreover, there should be a
more careful consideration of how to frame the normative questions we
are asking. We need to have a sense of the domain of normative theory
in light of our positive theories of constitutionalism and of constitutional
law.
Consider this example: States regulate the contours of local
20.
21.
(1999).

See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986).
See the discussion in JRPMY WALDRON, THE DIGNrY OF LEGISLATION 7-35

[VOL. 37: 523, 2000]

State Constitutionalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIENV

government fiscal policy in a myriad of ways. In California, for
example, there are severe restrictions on the power of local governments
to raise revenues through the property tax.2 There are limits on the
amount of municipal debt that a locality may incur to finance local
services,' there are constitutional "public purpose" requirements
designed to cabin private interest group influence, and there are, because
of an omnibus constitutional initiative recently enacted, a series of
limitations on the scope of municipal authority to raise revenues through
special assessments, user fees, and other local taxes. 2 The global
normative question raised by this constitutional structure is whether and
to what extent these constitutional rules serve aims we regard as attached
to our theory of state and local finance and also to our theory of
state/local relations under the state constitution. Yet, the only way that
this normative discussion can make sense is with a richer, more textured
sense of what our constitutionally created policy aims to accomplish
with this set of constitutional rules of fiscal policy.
There are competing and very different perspectives, regarding such
policy aims. Suppose, for example, we think that the state has a stake in
setting up a fiscal framework within which local decisions are made
because there is a comprehensive fiscal philosophy that undergirds the
state constitution. We could suppose that the state is concerned with
assuring a fiscal environment in which businesses are attracted to the
state, poorer residents are disinclined to stay, and, overall, the state is
enabled to compete successfully with other states for goods and services.
Since, after all, the state constructs its own public economy and since
local governments are regarded as creatures of the state, we could

imagine that the state manages its fiscal affairs by treating localities as
administrative units created and regulated in order to carry out the state's
comprehensive economic agenda.
This is a plausible depiction of the state's constitutional philosophy
with respect to fiscal affairs, but this is not the only possible depiction.
We might have a very different perspective on the positive theory
underlying state fiscal choices. Suppose that we think the state's only
commitment is to construct rules of the sort that structure local decisionmaking, but without an eye toward accomplishing any particular
approach to governance or ultimate policy end. Here, we might imagine
22.

See CAL. CoNST. art. XIIIA, § 1.

23.

See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.

24.

See CAL. CONsT. art. XIID, § 1.

that the state treats local governments as substate units of government,
as part of the state polity. These units of government are entitled, in the
view of the state, to create their own policy agendas and to pursue these

agendas through creative use of available fiscal instruments. This view
bears a relationship, after all, to how cooperative theories of federalism
treat the relationship between the national and state governments under
the Constitution. In this light, states have a two-fold agenda. They are
interested in creating rules that enable localities to pursue agendas, but

not where these agendas come into conflict with other local intereststhis is the problem of externalities-andnot where these agendas come
into conflict with the state's interest in managing its own fiscal affairsthis is the problem of conflict.
It is not this Essay's aim to unpack in any more detail these two
competing models of state constitutional philosophy in the fiscal realm.
Rather, it aims only to indicate that these two models rest on very
different positive theories of constitutionalism and constitutional
ideology; they also point to very different prescriptions. If, for example,
we think that the state constructs state/local fiscal relationships in order
to further a statewide aim, then we can evaluate constitutional strategies
in light of this aim. Part of our prescriptive analysis, in such case, will
entail a study of whether and to what extent certain fiscal strategies
enable or retard the state's ability to carry out its discernible policy
agenda. This structure of normative analysis will look different if we
begin with a positive theory of the fiscal constitution that stresses the
state's basic agnosticism with respect to local fiscal choices. At bottom,
these two competing perspectives point to two very different models of
state/local decision-making; they build, as well, upon very different
positive theories of state political decision-making and constitutional
philosophy.

To be sure, we also face questions of constitutional principle when we
scrutinize carefully the national Constitution. Yet, our approach to
discerning the positive theory of state constitutionalism is necessarily
more eclectic. After all, there is hardly a discernible philosophical
vision located in the choices of "framers" at a particular moment in time.
There is, for the most part, no defining moment in which the state
constructs its constitutional ideology. Or, if there are some moments,
they are confounded by the postframing changes in constitutional
structure-the frequent amendments, the subconstitutional choices made
by state political actors under the norm of the police power, and the
constitutional initiatives that represent the interventions of citizen voters
in shaping constitutional change. It is, in the end, tremendously difficult
to tackle normative questions of constitutional decision-making with
references to a discernible constitutional ideology manifest in the state

534

[VOL.

37: 523, 2000]

State Constitutionalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

constitution's text, its history, or its philosophy.
This does not mean that we ought to abandon normative theories of
state constitutionalism and constitutional law. On the contrary, the
normative questions are, if anything, more eclectic and fruitful. They
are eclectic to the extent that we are addressing not only narrow
questions of judicial rules and doctrines, but also questions of structural
design and institutional performance. They are fruitful to the extent that
many more issues of constitutional law and public policy are up for
grabs in the states. The fluidity of state constitutional discourse
connotes not only instability, but also opportunity for change. If

"government by reflection and choice" is the normative label attached to
our constitutional traditions, then perhaps reflection is the term
especially well suited to federal constitutional debate, and choice is more
properly attached to state constitutions.
IV. THE DOMAIN OF NORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
This characterization of state constitutionalism has implications for
constitutional discourse and normative constitutional argument. If
normative constitutional
theory in connection
with state
constitutionalism is seen as largely a product of political choice and
nonjudicial institutional decision-making, then we ought to think more
creatively about how to make arguments tailored to particular
institutions. Part of the agenda of the Legal Process movement was to
describe more systematically the comparative institutional competencies
of legislatures, courts, and agencies, and the different sorts of decisionmaking mechanisms available to these diffuse institutions." This Essay
is in harmony with these Legal Process efforts.
How would the constitutional discourse look different? Let us return
to the example of constitutional construction of local fiscal policy. In
contemporary California, many of the fundamental fiscal choices
otherwise available to local governments have been constricted by
operation of constitutional amendments. Proposition 13 and its progeny
substantially limited the availability of the property tax; they also
imposed supermajority requirements on local efforts to raise money
through other taxes.' Additionally, the recently enacted Proposition 218

25. See NEL DuxBURy, PATERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-99 (1995).
26.

See CAL. CoNsT. art. XIIIA, § 1.

imposes a wide range of legal limits on localities' taxing authority.'
From the perspective of constitutional adjudication, there is little left to
decide in terms of the operation of these initiatives; both, after all,
amend the constitution. Moreover, they were drafted carefully in order
to avoid the need for constant interpretation.
Yet, from a presumptive standpoint, we could concentrate our
constitutional discourse on efforts to refashion the structure of fiscal
policy. The point is not merely to convince voters or the legislature to
repeal the initiative; rather, the enterprise is to think creatively and
systematically about how to integrate certain constitutional principles
and structures into a framework of state/local relations of state fiscal
policy. One perspective on California's twenty-five-year experiment
with fiscal reconstruction-the "taxpayers' revolt"-is to view
California as gradually shrinking the public sector. The interests at stake
in these efforts are the private sector and individual property owners
who have, so the argument goes, seen their financial hegemony shrink in
the face of expanding local regulatory and taxing power. There are,
however, other perspectives on what is transpiring. One perspective is
to see the state as reigning in local governments in order to preserve a
more rational, scientific system of state/local finance. The principal
"evil," in this view, to which efforts such as Propositions 13 and 218 are
directed, is local fiscal mismanagement and irresponsibility. The agenda
is not to shrink the public sector; the state does not intend for the local
fiscal systems to wither away. Instead, California is grasping toward a
system of comprehensive fiscal rationality in which both the basic and
the specific elements of fiscal policy, especially through the operation of
the tax system, will be delineated through state constitutional
commands.
The structure of normative constitutional theory as it pertains to these
sets of issues will look quite different depending upon which of the
aforementioned perspectives we adopt. Further, this way of framing the
issue demands close attention to positive constitutionalism insofar as we
attempt to understand why the state is doing what it is doing. We are
concerned not only with the policy agendas underlying these fiscal
initiatives, but also, as constitutional theorists, with why the voters press
ahead with constitutionalapproaches. The domain of normative theory
is marked ultimately by the shape of constitutional decision-making in a
particular state or in state constitutional systems generally. At the same
time, the shape of constitutional decision-making-for example, whether
X or Y policy ought to be embedded in the state constitution, rather than
in "mere" legislation or administrative decree-is constructed in part by
27.
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normative constitutional argument.
One might want to highlight that this reveals nothing more or less than
the rather abstract observation that law is deeply influenced by politics
and vice versa. This dose of legal realism, while appropriate, is not
particularly tied to debates about state constitutional theory. However, it
is necessary to return to the earlier discussion of the nature of state
constitutions. As discussed, the fluidity of state constitutional decisionmaking affords contention on many issues which, when viewed through
the lens of federal constitutional theory, would be largely beyond
controversy. There is, simply put, much more at stake in constitutional
discourse directed to legislatures, to governors, to administrative
agencies, and to local officials. It is not enough to stress the point that
the contours of constitutional law in the state constitutional area are
formed by political actions in a distinct way; we need to continue toward
the heart of the matter by considering how the politics of state
constitutional decision-making and constitutional change ought to be
understood.
What is required is a theoretical framework for
understanding state politics and state institutions. This is necessary not
only to provide ground for our theories of positive constitutionalism, but

also to mark the domain of normative constitutional theory.
V. A FRAMEWORK EMPLOYING Posrrvw POLITICAL THEORY
What would such a framework look like? One emerging body of
theory that is especially fruitful, if still somewhat underdeveloped and
untested, is called positive political theory.2u Daniel Farber and Philip
Frickey, in an introduction to a symposium of the same name, define the
phrase as the "non-normative, rational-choice theories of political
institutions." 29 The basic idea is this: Decision-makers act within
political institutions to accomplish a complex series of aims; reelection
is certainly one incentive, but so too is the agenda of pursuing the public
good. Motivations of political decision-makers, like the motivations of
all humans, are complex and evolving. Yet these decision-makers must,
after all, make decisions. They do so within a matrix of institutions that
are not inherited and fixed, but rather fluid and constructed. Many of the

28. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of
Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994).
29. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive PoliticalTheory in
the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.L 457, 462 (1992) (emphasis omitted).

institutional choices we often take for granted-such as the existence
and persistence of the bicameral legislature, the delegation of broad
regulatory power to agencies, the system of consideration for proposed
legislation, and decision rules in courts-are the product of rational
action by decision-makers. Sometimes these decisions are made in
concert, with a suitable majority of legislators signing on to particular
institutional forms on the theory that these institutions will, on the
whole, contribute to the purposive agendas of all legislators in the
aggregate and over time. Other times these decisions represent the
strategic, calculating moves by legislators acting in an environment that
rewards, through incentives and resources, such strategic behavior.
Positive political theory steers our attention to the ways in which
decision-makers in public institutions make strategic choices. More
precisely, this body of theory builds upon the contributions of rational
choice theorists in political economics, philosophy, game theory, and
other fields in order to form testable hypotheses concerning political
action.
Positive political theory does not, by its own terms, tell us anything
about what to do with these positive frameworks. However, the domain

of normative constitutional theory is shaped powerfully, and for reasons
described throughout this Essay, by theories of positive
constitutionalism. For example, positive political theory suggests to us
that one of the factors that goes into legislative decisions to remove
certain policy issues from the political table and embed them in
constitutional forms is to decrease the opportunities for rent-seeking
behavior by politicians acting through normal political devices. So, one
plausible explanation for the constitutionalization of local fiscal policy
along the lines suggested by California's recent efforts is that state
decision-makers fear the competition for economic rents by localities
and hence will act to limit the domain of local political choice. If we
think that it is prudent for local decision-makers to compete with the
state, perhaps because such regulatory competition represents a
beneficial check on aggrandizing behavior by the central state, then we
might resist this process of constitutionalization of fiscal policy.
Moreover, we might direct our normative constitutional argument
toward decision-makers that we trust as being removed somewhat from
these political incentives. Or we might see the normative agenda as
being about imposing more substantial costs on the legislature to move
in these limiting directions. Efforts to limit statewide initiatives to a
single subject, for example, have this normative quality.
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VI. CONCLUSION: THE INTEGRATION OF POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY AND NORMATIVE THEORY-PERILS AND PAYOFF

In the end, we need positive frameworks of state constitutional
decision-making in order to understand the uses to which we can put our
normative arguments. The alternative is to detach normative debate
from positive constitutionalism altogether. This Essay suggests that this
detachment is characteristic of much of current constitutional theory
with regard to the federal Constitution. It need not and ought not
become a part of our emerging state constitutional theory.
Attaching positive constitutional theory to normative theory and
proceeding thereby to map out the domain of normative theory raises,
however, a series of problems about which we ought to be attentive.
Those of us engaged in the enterprise of state constitutional theory like
to think that we are working on a comparative project; that is, we hope
to generalize about state constitutions, rather than remain focused solely
on our own state's problems and conditions. State constitutional theory
is comparative in two different senses: First, we compare state
constitutions with one another in order to yield generalizations about
state constitutionalism. Second, we compare state constitutions with the
national Constitution, in order both to enrich our theory of federalism
and to examine ways in which state and national constitutional processes
can learn from one another. °

Comparative constitutional theory is extremely difficult, however,
since we need to achieve a better understanding of the common
elements, as well as differences, in the positive theory of
constitutionalism and the positive theory of constitutional law in the fifty
state constitutions. Such a comparative project is worthwhile. When we
begin to think systematically and more empirically about the law and
politics of constitution building and of constitutional change, we can
generate some useful hypotheses about state constitutions that are
testable and revealing. While the challenges facing states are distinct in
important ways, there are similar challenges that face all states in early
twenty-first century America. These challenges include welfare policy
in the postreform world, criminal justice and penal policy, the role of
state and local governments in the delineation and enforcement of rights,
30. For a skeptical view of the extent to which we can learn anything useful from
state constitutions in either sense, see James A. Gardner, The FailedDiscourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 761, 763 (1992).

and confronting modem urban problems and conditions. Insofar as state
constitutions represent the basic, fundamental legal environment in
which we as citizens-in our capacity as voters, policy-makers, and
members of local polities-make decisions, engaging matters of state
constitutional theory means engaging as well this range of pertinent
policy issues.
If we are successful in our efforts to generate a useful prescriptive
constitutional theory that ties together questions raised in our fifty
different state contexts, we will have performed an important public
service indeed. This Essay's aim has been to describe the ways in which
the theoretical underpinnings of these efforts require mapping out more
carefully the domain of normative constitutional theory in light of the
distinct nature of state constitutionalism.

